Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1989

A. Wayne Winegar and Mary Winegar v. Froerer
Corp., P.F. Investments, Fredrick Froerer III, Zane
Froerer, and Phyllis Froerer : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David R. Olsen, Paul M. Simmons; Suitter, Axland, Armstrong, and Hanson; Attorneys for
Appellants.
Joseph S. Knowlton; Attorney for Respondents.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Winegar v. Froerer Corporation, No. 890160.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2533

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
45.9
.S9
DOCKET NO.

U i m i out

i».

_

BRIEF

muto
r.'ovi a m
: ip

'- 'fk. Suprc

IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

A. WAYNE WINEGAR and
MARY WINEGAR, his wife,

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.
FROERER CORP., a Utah corporation;
P.F. INVESTMENTS, a Utah limited
partnership; FREDRICK FROERER, III;
ZANE FROERER; and PHYLLIS FROERER,
individuals;

Case No.

890160

CATEGORY NO. 14b

Defendants-Appellants.

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA PRESIDING

JOSEPH S. KNOWLTON, Esq.
Attorney for PlaintiffsRespondents
845 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Telephone: (801) 363-3191

DAVID R. OLSEN, Esq. #2458
PAUL M. SIMMONS, Esq. #4668
of and for
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys for DefendantsAppellants
700 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
Telephone: (801) 532-7300

IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

A. WAYNE WINEGAR and
MARY WINEGAR, his wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.
FROERER CORP., a Utah corporation;
P.F. INVESTMENTS, a Utah limited
partnership; FREDRICK FROERER, III;
ZANE FROERER; and PHYLLIS FROERER,
individuals;

Case No.

890160

CATEGORY NO. 14b

Defendants-Appellants.

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA PRESIDING

JOSEPH S. KNOWLTON, Esq.
Attorney for PlaintiffsRespondents
845 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Telephone: (801) 363-3191

DAVID R. OLSEN, Esq. #2458
PAUL M. SIMMONS Esq. #4668
of and for
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSO
Attorneys for DefendantsAppellants
700 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-148C
Telephone: (801) 532-7300

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Table of Authorities

m

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

CONTROLLING LAW

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

A.

Nature of the Case

•

B*

Course of Proceedings and Disposition
in the Court Below

C*

3

Statement of Facts

*

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
X.

II.

III.

IV.

3

4
•

7
10

The Plaintiffs Were Only Entitled to Summary
Judgment if There Were No Genuine Issues of
Material Fact and the Undisputed Facts Showed
That the Plaintiffs Were Entitled to a Judgment
as a Matter of Law

10

The Defendants Cannot Be Liable for Breach of
Contract Because They Were Not a Party to the
Contract, and They Did Not Assume Ranch Liquidators' Liabilities Under the Contract

11

If the Assignment Was Ambiguous, Extrinsic
Evidence Was Admissible to Show the Parties7
Intent, and the Extrinsic Evidence Before the
Court Showed That Froerer Corp. Did Not Intend to
Assume Ranch Liquidators' Obligations

17

Froerer Corp. Did Not Buy the Property From Ranch
Liquidators and Therefore Had No Obligation to
Convey the Property to the Plaintiffs

18

i -

V.

VI.

VII.

The Plaintiffs' Recorded of a Quitclaim Deed
Raised a Genuine Issue of Fact as to Whether the
Plaintiffs Had Waived Any Claim Against the
Defendants, Precluding Summary Judgment

23

The Trial Court Erred in Granting the Plaintiffs
Rescission Because All of the Parties to the
Contract Were Not Before the Court and Those
Before the Court Could Not Be Returned to Their
Status Quo
.

24

Even If the Trial Court Were Otherwise Correct in
Granting Summary Judgment, It Erred in Granting
Judgment to the Plaintiffs For the Full Amount of
Their Claim

26

CONCLUSION

27

ADDENDUM

30

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
American Savs. & Loan Ass'n v. Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d 2.89,
445 P.2d 1, 3 (1968)

23

Anderson v. Southwest Savs. & Loan Ass'n., 117 Ariz. 1042,
571 P.2d 1042, 1044 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977)

13

Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank. 737 P.2d 225, 229
(Utah 1987)

17

Barlow Society v. Commercial Security Bank, 723 P.2d 398
(Utah 1986)

10

Barnes v. Wood. 750 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). . .

23

Big Butte Ranch. Inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690, 691
(Utah 1977)
Bonardi v. Caron (In re Auburn Medical Realty),

18

19 Bankr. 113, 116 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982)

24

Bowen v. Riverton City. 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982)

11, 16, 21, 24

Briqqs v. Liddell. 699 P.2d 770, 773 (Utah 1985)

25

B-T Ltd. v. Blakeman. 705 P.2d 307, 312 (Wyo. 1985)

20

Burt v. Burt. 116 Utah 188, 209 P.2d 217, 220 (1949)

20

Bvbee v. Stewart. 112 Utah 462, 189 P.2d 118, 122-23 (1948) .

19

John Call Eng'q, Inc. v. Manti Citv Corn. . 743 P.2d 1205,
1207 (Utah 1987)
Cuchine v. H.O. Bell, Inc.. 682 P.2d 723, 725 (Mont. 1984). .

17
12

Encrlestein v. Mintz. 345 111. 48, 61, 177 N.E. 746, 752
(1931)

14

Farr v. Link. 746 P.2d 431, 433 (Wyo. 1987)

17

Givan v. Lambeth. 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P.2d 959, 961 (1960). .

20

- iii -

Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 106 (Utah 1984)

20

Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126 (Utah 1987)

10

Klundt v. Carothers, 96 Idaho 782,
537 P.2d 62, 65 (1975)

13, 14

Lomavaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324, 1325
(9th Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 425 U.S. 903 (1976)

24

McEnroe v. Morgan. 106 Idaho 326, 678 P.2d 595, 598
(Idaho Ct. App. 1984)

26

McGraw v. Ayling fin re Bell & Beckwith),
54 Bankr. 303, 306 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985)

27

Mark Steel Cora, v. Eimco Corp., 548 P.2d 892, 894
(Utah 1976)

15

Murr v. Selag Corn., 113 Idaho 773, 747 P.2d 1302, 1309
(Idaho Ct. App. 1987)
12, 14, 15
Qberhansly v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah 1977), . . . .

17

Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Heath. 90 Utah 187, 194,
61 P.2d 308, 312 (1936)

23

S.L. Nusbaum & Co. v. Atlantic Va. Realty Corp., 206 Va. 673,
146 S.E.2d 205, 209 (1966)

13

S.T. McKnight Co. y. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
120 F.2d 310, 320 (8th Cir. 1941)

13, 14

Themv v. Seagull Enters., Inc.. 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979). . .11, 22
Utah State University of Agriculture & Applied Science v.
Sutro & Co. . 646 P.2d 715, 720 n.14 (Utah 1982)
Whitelev v. De Vries. 116 Utah 165,
209 P.2d 206, 207 (1949)

19, 20

Whitelev v. O'Dell, 219 Kan. 314,
548 P.2d 798, 802 (1976)

26-27

Wohlschlegel v. Uhlmann-Kihei. Inc.. 662 P.2d 505, 514
(Hawaii Ct. App. 1983)

- iv -

11

12

Wvcalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821,
116 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 29 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)

10

Court Rules
Judicial Council Rule of Judicial Administration 4-504. . . .
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56

3

2, 10

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(2) (1989)

16

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-8

- -

19

Other Authorities
83 C.J.S. Subject at 555

#

Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 3

- v -

13
1

IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

]1
]

A. WAYNE WINEGAR and
MARY WINEGAR, his wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

]
1

FROERER CORP., a Utah corporation; )
P.F. INVESTMENTS, a Utah limited
partnership; FREDRICK FROERER, III;
ZANE FROERER; and PHYLLIS FROERER, )
individuals;

Case No.

890160

CATEGORY NO. 14b

Defendants-Appellants.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a Summary Judgment entered on
February 3, 1989, and from the Order Denying Motion to Amend Judgment and Relief from Judgment entered on March 20, 1989.

The Utah

Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to the Utah
Constitution, article VIII, section 3, and Utah Code Ann. § 73-22(3) (j).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the assignment from Ranch Liquidators to Froerer

Corp. constitute, as a matter of law, an assumption by Froerer
Corp. of Ranch Liquidators' obligations and liabilities under Ranch
Liquidators' purchase agreement with the plaintiffs?

- 1 -

2.

If the assignment was ambiguous, did the trial court

err in granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs where the only
evidence of the parties7 intent showed that Froerer Corp- did not
intend to assume Ranch Liquidators' obligations and liabilities?
3.

Did the trial court err in concluding, as a matter

of law and without considering evidence of the parties' intent, that
there was an unconditional delivery of the warranty deed to Froerar
Corp., which transferred fee title to Froerer Corp-, as opposed
to a conditional delivery as security for Froerer Corp.'s right
to receive future payments under the Purchase Agreement?
4^

Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment

for the plaintiffs where the plaintiffs' recording of a quitclaim
deed raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether the plaintiffs
had waived any claim against the defendants?
5.

Did the trial court err in granting rescission where

a party to the contract was not before the court and the defendants
could not be returned to their status quo ante?
6.

Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment

against the defendants for the full amount of the plaintiffs' claim?

CONTROLLING LAW
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is determinative of the
second, third and fourth issues presented by this appealrule is set out verbatim in the Addendum- 2 -

The

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A*

Nature of the Case.
The plaintiffs brought this action alleging that they

had been damaged by the defendants' negligence and that the defendants had breached a purchase agreement between the plaintiffs and
Ranch Liquidators of Utah, Inc., which the plaintiffs alleged had
been assigned to the defendants.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below,
The plaintiffs filed this action in August 1987.

After

amending their Complaint, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment.
After a hearing on the motion for summary judgment, which was not
recorded, the court entered a minute ruling granting the plaintiffs7 motion as prayed.

Record at 80.

A summary judgment was

entered on February 3, 1989, Record at 86, without the defendants
having an opportunity to object thereto as required by rule 4-504
of the Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration.

On

February 21, 1989, the defendants filed a Motion to Amend Judgment
and Relief from Judgment,1 which the Court denied on March 20,
1989.

Record at 93-94, 105.

of appeal on April 17, 1989.

The defendants filed a timely notice
Record at 106-07.

1

The motion objected to the judgment on the grounds that
it had been entered in violation of rule 4-504, it inadequately
reflected the relief granted, it was unsupported by the evidence
and it was contrary to law and based on an error of law. The motion
incorporated the defendants' objections to the proposed form of
judgment, which was previously filed. See Record at 93-94, 88-89.
• 3 -

C.

Statement of Facts.
1.

On July 28, 1979, the plaintiffs, A. Wayne and Mary

Winegar, entered into an Option Agreement and Agreement for Sale
of Real Estate ("Purchase Agreement") with Ranch Liquidators of
Utah, Inc. ("Ranch Liquidators"), to buy certain property in
Duchesne County, Utah (the "Property").

Record at 38 1 1 & 42-

43.
2.

The Purchase Agreement required Ranch Liquidators

to deliver to the Winegars a warranty deed conveying clear title
to the Property upon the Winegars7 payment in full of the purchase
price.

Record at 43 if 1.
3.

The Purchase Agreement further provided for a down

payment by the Winegars of $3,480 (which was paid to Ranch Liquidators) and monthly payments of $141.50 beginning August 20, 1979,
until paid in full.
4.

See Record at 42.

In June 1980, defendant Froerer Corp. bought from

Ranch Liquidators its right to receive future payments under the
Purchase Agreement.

Record at 74 if 2; Deposition of Frederick

Froerer III (hereinafter "Froerer Depo.") at 7, 30, 37. This sale
was evidenced by an Assignment of Contract and Escrow dated June
11, 1980, and signed only by Ranch Liquidators (the "Assignment").
Record at 44.

- 4 -

5.

In acquiring Ranch Liquidators7 rights to future

payments under the Purchase Agreement, Froerer Corp, did not assume
Ranch Liquidators' liabilities.
6.

Record at 44 & 74 «ff 2-4.

To secure Froerer Corp.'s right to future payments

under the Purchase Agreement, Ranch Liquidators gave Froerer Corp.
a warranty deed covering the Property, which was to become effective
upon the plaintiffs' default under the Purchase Agreement.
Depo. at 25-2 6, 28.

Froerer

The plaintiffs never defaulted on their obli-

gations under the Purchase Agreement, and the warranty deed was
not recorded until June 15, 1984, after this dispute arose and at
the request of plaintiff A. Wayne Winegar.

Froerer Depo. at 6, 24-

25; Record at 45.
7.

In about June 1980, Froerer Corp. notified the

plaintiffs of the Assignment, and the plaintiffs began making payments to Froerer Corp.
8.

Record at 3 9 <[«f 4-5.

In March 1982, Ranch Liquidators gave Mecca Enter-

prises a quitclaim deed to the Property, which was recorded
March 25, 1982.
9.

Record at 51.

In May 1984, the plaintiffs completed their payments

under the Purchase Agreement and asked Froerer Corp. for a warranty
deed to the Property.
10.

Record at 39 f<[ 5-6.

In response to the plaintiffs' request, Froerer

Corp. notified the plaintiffs that they should seek their warranty
deed from Ranch Liquidators.

Froerer Depo. at 27, However, in a
- 5 -

good-faith effort to resolve this dispute, Froerer Corp. gave the
plaintiffs a quitclaim deed to the Property, which the plaintiffs
accepted and recorded.
11.

Record at 39 f 6 & 46,

In August 1987, the plaintiffs brought this action

against Froerer Corp. alleging that it had negligently failed to
record its warranty deed, allowing the Property to be deeded to
third parties, that it had negligently failed to make payments to
the fee owner, allowing the Property to be foreclosed, that it
had been unjustly enriched by the amounts it had received under
the Purchase Agreement, and that it had breached the Purchase Agreement by failing to provide the plaintiffs with a warranty deed
and title insurance.2
12.

Record at 2-4.

On December 5, 1988, the plaintiffs moved for summary

judgment, seeking rescission of the Purchase Agreement and a judgment for the amounts they had paid under the Purchase Agreement.
Record at 38-54.
13.

In response to the plaintiffs' motion for summary

judgment, the defendants submitted the Affidavit of Fredrick
Froerer, III, which stated that the Assignment was merely an assignment of the rights to receive payments due under the Purchase Agreement, that Froerer Corp. never agreed to assume Ranch Liquidators'
2

The plaintiffs later amended their Complaint to add as
defendants P.F. Investments and the individual defendants (Fredrick
Froerer III, Zane Froerer and Phyllis Froerer), whom the plaintiffs
alleged had succeeded to the assets and liabilities of Froerer
Corp. See Record at 20 f 1.
- 6 -

liabilities under the Purchase Agreement and that Froerer Corp.
did not intend its acceptance of the Assignment to constitute an
assumption of Ranch Liquidators7 liabilities.

Record at 73-74.

The plaintiffs did not submit any affidavits disputing Mr. Froerer7s
testimony but instead relied on the documents appended to their
briefs.

See Record at 42-53 & 67-69.
14.

By a minute entry dated January 31, 1989, the court

granted the plaintiffs7 motion "as prayed" based on "the rationale
submitted and argued by the plaintiff" in support of the motion,
which the court found to be "the more reasonable under the facts
and . . • more in support of the apparent intent of the parties."
Record at 80.

A summary judgment was subsequently entered.

Record

at 86-87.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The plaintiffs were only entitled to summary judgment
if there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
undisputed facts showed that the plaintiffs were entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.
meet either requirement.

(Point I.)

The plaintiffs did not

Not only were there genuine factual issues

as to the intent of the parties to the relevant transactions, but
also, under the plaintiffs7 legal theories and the undisputed evidence of record, the plaintiffs were not entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.

- 7 -

The trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment "as prayed," for the reasons "submitted and argued by" the
plaintiffs in support of their motion.

Record at 80.

The plaintiffs argued two theories in support of their
motion.

First, they argued that Froerer Corp- breached its contract;

with the plaintiffs by not giving the plaintiffs a warranty deed
conveying clear title to the Property-

Second, the plaintiffs

argued that Froerer Corp- had bought the Property from Ranch
Liquidators with notice of the plaintiffs7 equitable interest in
the Property under the Purchase Agreement and was therefore requirec
to convey the Property to the plaintiffs when they fully complied
with the Purchase Agreement-

See Record at 40-41 & 81-83.

The trial court's decision was based solely "on the legal
effect of the docum[e]nts of contract and conveyance."
80.

Record at

The plaintiffs' first theory must fail because the Assignment

(the document of contract) clearly shows that Froerer Corp- did
not assume Ranch Liquidators' liabilities under the Purchase Agreement but only took an assignment of Ranch Liquidators' right to
future payments.

(Point II.)

If the Assignment was ambiguous,

parol evidence was admissible to show the parties' intent, and
the only parol evidence of intent before the court showed that
Froerer Corp. did not intend to assume Ranch Liquidators'
liabilities.

(Point III.)

Thus, Ranch Liquidators remained liable

under its contract with the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs' claim
- 8 -

for breach of contract lies against Ranch Liquidators—not these
defendants•
The defendant's second theory fails because the undisputed
evidence showed that Froerer Corp. did not buy the Property from
Ranch Liquidators but only took a warranty deed to secure its right
to receive payments under the Purchase Agreement.

At the very

least, the intent of the parties to the warranty deed raised a
genuine issue of material fact that precluded summary judgment.
(Point IV.)
The plaintiffs7 acceptance and recording of a quitclaim
deed from Froerer Corp. also raised an issue of material fact—
namely, whether the plaintiffs waived any claim they may have had
against the-defendant—making summary judgment inappropriate.
(Point V.)
Not only was summary judgment inappropriate, but also
the relief the plaintiffs prayed for—rescission of the Purchase
Agreement and a return of the monies they paid—was not available
under the facts of this case because a party to the agreement—
Ranch Liquidators—was not before the court and the defendants
could not be returned to their status quo ante.

(Point VI.)

Finally, even assuming that the trial court was correct
in granting summary judgment, it erred in granting the plaintiffs
summary judgment against the defendants for the full amount the
plaintiffs paid under the Purchase Agreement because the undisputed
- 9 -

facts showed that the defendants did not receive the full amount
the plaintiffs paid,

(Point VII.)
ARGUMENT

I,

THE PLAINTIFFS WERE ONLY ENTITLED TO SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IF THERE WERE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF
MATERIAL FACT AND THE UNDISPUTED FACTS SHOWED
THAT THE PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT
AS A MATTER OF LAW.

As this court well knows, summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law."

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Ingram

v, Salt Lake Citv. 733 P.2d 126, 126 (Utah 1987) (per curiam).
"Appellate courts scrutinize summary judgments under the same
standard applied by the trial courts, according no particular
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions concerning
whether the material facts are in dispute and, if they are
not, what legal result obtains."

Wycalis v. Guardian Title,

780 P.2d 821, 116 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 29 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
In considering a summary judgment, the trial and
appellate courts must view the facts in a light most favorable
to the party opposing the motion.

See, e.g., Barlow Society

v. Commercial Security Bankr 723 P.2d 398, 399 (Utah 1986);
- 10 -

Themv v. Seagull Enters., Inc., 595 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah
1979) . Any doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of fact
must be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion,
and all reasonable inferences that can fairly be drawn from
the evidence must be evaluated in a light most favorable to
the opposing party,
43 6 (Utah 1982).

Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434,

Summary judgment should be granted only "when

it clearly appears that there is no reasonable probability
that the party moved against could prevail."

Utah State

University of Agriculture & Applied Science v. Sutro & Co.,
646 P.2d 715, 720 n.14 (Utah 1982),
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment
because, as shown below, there were genuine issues of material
fact and the plaintiffs were not entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.

II.

THE DEFENDANTS CANNOT BE LIABLE FOR BREACH OF
CONTRACT BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT A PARTY TO THE
CONTRACT, AND THEY DID NOT ASSUME RANCH LIQUIDATORS7 LIABILITIES UNDER THE CONTRACT.

The plaintiffs sought, by their motion for summary judgment, to rescind the Purchase Agreement and to receive a return
of their investment because the defendants had not complied with
the provision of the agreement requiring them to give the plaintiffs
a warranty deed and title insurance.
- 11 -

See Record at 40-41.

The

defendants, of course, were not parties to the Purchase Agreement
and therefore had no obligation to convey clear title to the plaintiffs under that agreement unless they assumed such an obligation.
The plaintiffs argued that Froerer Corp, assumed Ranch Liquidators'
liabilities under the Purchase Agreement when it took an assignment
of the agreement„
The law is clear that, absent an assumption of liability,
an assignment of a contract does not impose on the assignee the
assignor's duties or liabilities under the contract.

See, e.g.,

Murr v. Selag CoriD. , 113 Idaho 773, 747 P. 2d 1302, 1309 (Idaho
Ct« App. 1987); Wohlschleoel v. Uhlmann-Kihei, I n c . 662 P.2d 505,
514 (Hawaii Ct. App, 1983) • Before an assignee can be subject to
liability under its assignor's contract, it must be "clearly shown
that the assignee • . . expressly or impliedly assumed the assignor's liability,"
(Mont. 1984)•

Cuchine v. H.O. Bell, I n c . 682 P.2d 723, 725

"An assignee's assumption of an assignor's

liabilities is never presumed, and the burden of proof is upon
the party who asserts that there has been an assumption" to show
an assumption by "clear and unequivocal" evidence,

Murr, 747 P.2d

at 1309 (citations omitted).
Froerer Corp- did not expressly assume Ranch Liquidators'
liabilities.

In fact, it expressly did not assume them.

The

Assignment by its terms only transferred to Froerer Corp, Ranch
Liquidators' "right, title, interest and equity" in the Purchase
- 12 -

Agreement—not Ranch Liquidators' obligations or liabilitiesRecord at 44,

In other words, it was an assignment of a contract

receivable, of Ranch Liquidators' right to receive future payments
under the Purchase Agreement-

See Froerer Depo. at 3 0 & 37.

Moreover, the Assignment further stated that the Purchase Agreement
"is being held by Ranch Liquidators of Utah, Inc.," showing the
parties' intent that Ranch Liquidators—not Froerer Corp.—remain
obligated under the Purchase Agreement.
Finally, the Assignment stated:

"Buyer accepts this

Assignment subject to the covenants and conditions contained in
said agreement of sale."

Record at 44 (emphasis added).

Courts

have often construed the words "subject to" and have concluded
that "[t]he words Nsubject to' are not promissory."
Carothers, 96 Idaho 732, 537 P.2d 62, 65 (1975).

Klundt v.

"They are words

of qualification and notice and not words of assumption" or contract.

S.L. Nusbaum & Co. v. Atlantic Va. Realty Corp., 206 Va.

673, 146 S.E.2d 205, 209 (1966).

See also S.T. McKniaht Co. v.

Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 120 F.2d 310, 320 (8th Cir. 1941).
They connote "an absence of personal obligation."

S.L. Nusbaum,

146 S.E.2d at 209 (quoting 33 C.J.S. Subject at 555). "There is
nothing in the use of the words Nsubject to,' in their ordinary
use, which would even hint at the creation of affirmative rights."
Anderson v. Southwest Savs. & Loan Ass'n, 117 Ariz. 1042, 571 P.2d
1042, 1044 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (quoting Enalestein v. Mintz,
- 13 -

345 111. 48, 61, 177 N.E. 746, 752 (1931)).

The law is clear that

one who takes an assignment of assets "subject to" a covenant,
condition or obligation does not thereby assume liability for a
breach of the covenant, condition or obligation.

See, e.g., S.T.

McKniaht Co., 120 F,2d at 320; Klundt, 537 P.2d at 65This case is similar to Murr v. Selag Corporation, 113
Idaho 773, 747 P.2d 1302 (Idaho Ct. App, 1987).

Selag sold certain

property to the Murrs and received, in partial payment, a $48,000
note secured by a trust deed.

Selag was indebted to SeaFirst.

To reduce its debt to SeaFirst, Selag transferred all of its assets,
including the Murrs' note and trust deed, to SeaFirst, subject to
certain claims.

747 P.2d at 13 04.

The Murrs brought an action

against Selag when they discovered that the property contained
less acreage than Selag had represented.

They later amended their

complaint to add SeaFirst as a defendant and to seek rescission
of the contract.

The trial court found that the Murrs were entitled

to rescission and restitution and further found that, by virtue
of the assignment from Selag to SeaFirst of the Murrs' note and
trust deed, SeaFirst had assumed any liability Selag had toward
the Murrs.

The court ordered both Selag and SeaFirst to reimburse

the Murrs for all their payments, taxes and expenses incurred as
a result of the sale.
The Idaho Court of Appeals reversed as to SeaFirst.
The court noted that the assignment, like the Assignment here,
- 14 -

did not express any intent by SeaFirst to assume liability for
the Murrs' claims against Selag.

Id. at 1310.

The court further

held:
The effect given to the words "subject to" is
that the obligor on the note may assert setoffs
against it or may have defenses that make the
note uncollectible, but the obligor cannot
make affirmative claims for damages against
the note assignee based upon some tort or breach
of contract by the original payee.
£d. at 1309 (citation omitted).

The court concluded that, by the

assignment from Selag, SeaFirst did not assume Selag's liability
for affirmative claims made by the Murrs.3
Similarly, the Assignment from Ranch Liquidators to
Froerer Corp. did not make Froerer Corp. liable for any claim that
the Winegars may have had against Ranch Liquidators under the Purchase Agreement.

The Assignment is clear on its face.

It states

that it is accepted "subject to the covenants and conditions contained in" the Purchase Agreement.

The court cannot add to, ignore

or discard words in a contract but must give them "an objective
and reasonable construction."

Mark Steel Corp. v. Eimco Corr>.,

548 P.2d 892, 894 (Utah 1976).

The language of the Assignment,

as a matter of law, limited Froerer Corp.'s liability and showed

J

Moreover, the court held that a second agreement, between
SeaFirst, Selag and the principal owner of Selag, by which the
parties agreed that SeaFirst "shall be responsible as owners of
the Murr" claim "for the handling of the matter," did not make
SeaFirst liable on the Murrs' claim against Selag. 747 P.2d at
1310-13.
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its intent not to assume Ranch Liquidators' obligations under the
Purchase Agreement,
The conclusion that Froerer Corp* did not assume Ranch
Liquidators' liabilities is supported not only by the language of
the Assignment but by inferences drawn from the Assignment itself.
Under the Purchase Agreement, Ranch Liquidators had the duty to
convey clear title to the plaintiffs, upon the plaintiffs' payment
of the purchase price.

If the parties to the Assignment had

intended that Froerer Corp, become liable on that obligation, they
would have required Froerer Corp. to sign the Assignment, since,
under Utah's statute of frauds, a "promise to answer for the debt,
default or miscarriage of another" is void unless it (or some
memorandum of the agreement) is "in writing subscribed by the party
to be charged therewith-"

Utah Code Ann- § 25-5-4(2) (1989)-

Not

only was the Assignment not signed by Froerer Corp-, there was
not even a signature line on the Assignment for Froerer Corp.
See Record at 44.

One could infer from this that the parties to

the Assignment did not intend Froerer Corp- to answer for Ranch
Liquidators' default in failing to convey clear title-

On a motion

for summary judgment, the trial court was required to draw that
inference-

See Bowen v. Riverton Citv, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah

1982) .
Because the Assignment did not constitute an assumption
by Froerer Corp. of Ranch Liquidators' Liabilities, the defendants
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cannot, as a matter of law, be liable for Ranch Liquidators' failure
to convey clear title, and the trial court erred in granting the
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.
III.

IF THE ASSIGNMENT WAS AMBIGUOUS, EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
WAS ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW THE PARTIES' INTENT, AND
THE EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT SHOWED THAT
FROERER CORP. DID NOT INTEND TO ASSUME RANCH
LIQUIDATORS' OBLIGATIONS.

An assignment is a contract and is interpreted according
to the rules of contract construction.
746 P.2d 431, 433 (Wyo. 1987).

See, e.g., Farr v. Link,

In interpreting a contract, the

intentions of the parties are controlling.

John Call Ena'a, Inc.

v. Manti City Cora.. 743 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1987).

If possible,

those intentions must be found in the written contract itself.
Atlas Corn, v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987);
Oberhanslv v. Earla. 572 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah 1977).

The trial court apparently recognized and tried to follow
these principles of contract construction.

It held that the plain-

tiffs' interpretation of the relevant documents was "more in support
of the apparent intent of the parties."

However, the f i a l court

did not base its decision on any direct, extrinsic evidence of
the parties' intent but solely on "the legal effect of the
docum[e]nts of contract and conveyance."

Record at 80.

As shown

above, the legal effect of the Assignment was that Froerer Corp.
did not assume Ranch Liquidators' liabilities but took Ranch
Liquidators' right to payments under the Purchase Agreement "subject
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to" those liabilities.

Thus, based on the parties' intent, as

shown by the clear language of the Assignment, the plaintiffs were
not entitled to summary judgment.
If, however, the meaning of the Assignment was ambiguous
or uncertain, then the court was required to determine the parties'
intentions from evidence other than the contract itself.
Ranch. Inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690, 691 (Utah 1977).

Big Butte

The only

extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent that was before the court
was the Affidavit of Fredrick Froerer, III, which showed that
Froerer Corp. never intended to assume Ranch Liquidators' liabilities under the Purchase Agreement when it accepted the Assignment
from Ranch Liquidators.

See Record at 73-74.

Thus, even if the

Assignment was unclear or ambiguous, the court would have had to
reach the same conclusion, namely, that Froerer Corp. did not assume
Ranch Liquidators' liabilities, and the plaintiffs would still
not be entitled to summary judgment*
IV.

FROERER CORP. DID NOT BUY THE PROPERTY FROM RANCH
LIQUIDATORS AND THEREFORE HAD NO OBLIGATION TO
CONVEY THE PROPERTY TO THE PLAINTIFFS.

The plaintiffs' second theory for the defendants' alleged
liability was that Froerer Corp. bought the Property from Ranch
Liquidators with knowledge of the plaintiffs' interest in the Property under the Purchase Agreement and therefore took the Property
impressed with a trust in favor of the plaintiffs and were under
an obligation to complete the Purchase Agreement and convey the
- 18 -

Property to the plaintiffs upon their payment of the purchase price.
See Record at 40-41.

The plaintiffs' second argument must fail

because the undisputed evidence showed that Froerer Corp. did not
buy the Property but received a warranty deed to the Property only
as security for its right to receive payments under the Purchase
Agreement.
The trial court based its decision on "the legal effect
of the docum[e]nts of contract and conveyance."

Record at 30.

Apparently, the trial court concluded that, because Ranch Liquidators had given Froerer Corp. a warranty deed to the Property, there
had been an absolute conveyance of the Property from Ranch Liquidators to Froerer Corp.

However, under Utah law, one cannot con-

clude from the existence of a warranty deed alone that there has
been a conveyance of fee title to property.

Thus, the trial court

erred in concluding that the plaintiffs were entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.
Under Utah law, a deed, absolute in form, may be given
to secure a claim or indebtedness.

In such a case, the deed is

construed as a mortgage and not as a conveyance o* title to or an
estate in .land.

Utah Code Ann. § 73-40-8 (1987); Whitelev v. De

Vries, 116 Utah 165, 209 P.2d 206, 207 (1949); Bvbee v. Stewart.
112 Utah 462, 189 P.2d 118, 122-23 (1948).
Moreover, for a conveyance of real property to be effective, there must be a delivery of the deed from the grantor to
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the grantee with the intention of transferring ownershipv. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P.2d 959, 961 (1960).
also be an acceptance on the part of the granteeBlakeman, 705 P-2d 307, 312 (Wyo. 1985).

Givan

There must

B-T Ltd- v.

A deed can be delivered

conditionally, that is, to take effect only on the happening of a
certain event-

When it is so delivered, it has no immediate effect

on title to the land-

Burt v. Burt, 116 Utah 188, 209 P-2d 217,

220 (1949) Delivery and acceptance of a deed are matters of intention-

B-T Ltd., 705 P.2d at 312.

Whether or not there has been

a delivery with the intent to transfer title and whether or not
there has been an acceptance by the grantee are questions of factSee Horton v. Horton, 695 P-2d 102, 106 (Utah 1984); B-T Ltd.,
705 P.2d at 311-12-

Parol evidence was admissible to show that

the parties intended a mortgage and not an absolute conveyance of
title to property.

Whitelev, 2 09 P.2d at 2 07.

The only direct evidence of Ranch Liquidators' and Froerer
Corp-'s intent was the testimony of Fredrick Froerer III.

Mr.

Froerer testified in his deposition that Froerer Corp- bought from,
Ranch Liquidators certain contract receivables and received from
Ranch Liquidators deeds to the lots covered by the contracts solely
to give title to Froerer Corp. in the event of default by the contract purchasers-

Froerer Depo- at 26-

See also id. at 28, 8.

In other words, the warranty deeds to Froerer Corp. were only meant
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as security, to secure Froerer Corp.'s right to receive the contract
payments.

If the contract purchasers did not default on their

obligations, the deeds would never become effective, and "Froerer
Corporation would not be entitled or in the chain of title.tf
Froerer Depo. at 8.

This testimony was not disputed.

In addition to this direct testimony of the parties'
intent, the trial court could conclude from the circumstantial
evidence that the parties did not intend the warranty deed as a
present conveyance of fee title.

Froerer Corp. apparently received

the deed when it took the assignment of Ranch Liquidators' contract
receivable, see Froerer Depo. at 3, but it never recorded the deed.4
Yet it did record a Notice of Assignment of Contracts, which covered
the Assignment of the Purchase Agreement.

See Record at 67-63.

Froerer Corp.'s conduct is perfectly consistent with its position
that the warranty deed was not meant as a present conveyance of
fee title but only as security for Froerer Corp.'s right to receive
contract payments.

One could certainly infer as much from the

recording history of the relevant documents, and the defendants
were entitled, on the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, to
have the trial court draw that inference.

See Bowen v. Riverton

City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982).

The deed was eventually recorded at the request of
plaintiff A. Wayne Winegar. See Record at 45.
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In short, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the defendants, the party opposing the motion, and drawing all
reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the defendants7
position, as the trial court was required to do, see id., the court
would have had to conclude that Ranch Liquidators' delivery to
Froerer Corp. of a warranty deed was not meant to transfer title
but was given only to secure Froerer Corp.'s right to receive future
payments under the Purchase Agreement and that delivery of the
deed only created a mortgage on the Property and did not transfer
to Froerer Corp. title to the Property.

If that was the case,

Froerer Corp. had no obligation to convey clear title to the plaintiffs upon their payment of the purchase price.

That obligation

remained with Ranch Liquidators, the owner of the Property and
the seller under the Purchase Agreement.

Any claim that the plain-

tiffs had as a result of their failure to receive a warranty deed
would therefore lie against Ranch Liquidators and not against the
defendants.

Thus, the trial court erred in granting the plaintiffs

summary judgment because, based on the facts of record evaluated
in a light most favorable to the defendants, the plaintiffs were
not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Enters.. Inc.. 595 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah 1979).

- 22 -

See Themv v. Seagull

V.

THE PLAINTIFFS' RECORDING OF A QUITCLAIM DEED RAISED
A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO WHETHER THE PLAINTIFFS
HAD WAIVED ANY CLAIM AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS,
PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

After the plaintiffs had made all of the payments required
by the Purchase Agreement, they asked Froerer Corp. for a warranty
deed to the Property.

Froerer Corp. explained to the plaintiffs

that they should seek a warranty deed from Ranch Liquidators, the
party with whom they had contracted for a warranty deed.

However,

in an effort to resolve this dispute and clear any cloud on the
title that may have been created by Froerer Corp.'s recording of
its Notice of Assignment of Contracts, Froerer Corp. gave the plaintiffs a quitclaim deed to the Property, which the plaintiffs
accepted and recorded.

See Record at 46.

The defendants claimed

that, by accepting and recording this quitclaim deed, the plaintiffs
waived any claim they may have had against the defendants.
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known
right.

American Savs. & Loan Ass'n v. Blomouist, 21 Utah 2d 289,

445 P.2d 1, 3 (1968); Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988)«

A waiver may be express or implied and may arise

from acts, words or conduct of the one waiving the right.

Phoenix

Ins. Co. v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 194, 61 P.2d 308, 312 (1936);
Barnes, 750 P.2d at 1230.

A waiver requires an intention on the

part of the party waiving the right to relinquish the right.
Barnes, 750 P.2d at 1230.

Whether or not a right has been waived

is generally a question of fact.

Id.
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One could infer from the plaintiffs' acceptance and recording of the quitclaim deed that they thereby waived any claims
they may have had against the defendants.

The plaintiffs did not

submit any evidence negating that inference, and, on a motion for
summary judgment, the court is required to draw from the evidence
those inferences most favorable to the party opposing the motion.
Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982).

At the

very least, the plaintiffs' intent in accepting and recording the
quitclaim deed raised a genuine issue of material fact, precludincf
summary j udgment.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PLAINTIFFS
RESCISSION BECAUSE ALL OF THE PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT
WERE NOT BEFORE THE COURT AND THOSE BEFORE THE COURT
COULD NOT BE RETURNED TO THEIR STATUS QUO.

The plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment sought rescission of the Purchase Agreement and a return of their investment*
See Record at 41.

The trial court erred in granting the plaintiffs

rescission because the other party to the contract—Ranch Liquidators—was not a party to their action,

"No procedural principle

is more deeply imbedded in the common law than that, in an action
to set aside a . . . contract, all parties who may be affected by
the determination of the action are indispensable.'1

Lomavaktewa

v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1975), cert, denied,
425 U.S. 903 (1976).

See also Bonardi v. Caron fin re Auburn

Medical Realty), 19 Bankr. 113, 116 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982) (where
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the rights sued upon arise from a contract, all parties to the
contract must be joined).

A judgment rescinding a contract

obviously affects the parties to the contract-

The only parties

to the Purchase Agreement were the plaintiffs and Ranch Liquidators.
The trial court therefore erred in granting the plaintiffs a summary
judgment rescinding the Purchase Agreement because the other party
to the agreement was not before the court.
Moreover, the trial court erred in granting rescission
because the defendants could not be returned to their status quo
ante*
An essential part of rescission of a contract is to
restore the parties to their status quo prior to their entering
into the contract.
773 (Utah 1985).

See, e.cr, , Briaas v. Liddell, 699 P. 2d 770,

To the extent that the trial court concluded

that Froerer Corp. had become a party to the Purchase Agreement,
assuming Ranch Liquidators7 liabilities thereunder, the trial court
erred in granting rescission because Froerer Corp. could not be
returned to its position before it became a party to the contract.
It has lost the money that it paid to Ranch Liquidators to take
an assignment of Ranch Liquidators' contract receivable.

Moreover,

it has also lost its security for any claim that it may have had
against Ranch Liquidators for a return of its money.

Finally, to

the extent that the trial court required Froerer Corp. to return
to the plaintiffs the monies they paid to Ranch Liquidators, the
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judgment does not put the defendants in their status quo ante but
in a worse position than they were in before the Assignment.
infra pt. VI.

See

For all of these reasons, the trial court erred in

granting the plaintiffs rescission.
VII.

EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT WERE OTHERWISE CORRECT IN
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IT ERRED IN GRANTING
JUDGMENT TO THE PLAINTIFFS FOR THE FULL AMOUNT OF
THEIR CLAIM.

Even if the trial court were otherwise correct in concluding that the plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment, it
erred by granting them summary judgment for the entire purchase
price of the Property and not for the amounts paid to Froerer Corp.
The evidence was undisputed that the plaintiffs entered into the
Purchase Agreement on July 28, 1979, that they paid $3,480 as a
down payment on the Property, that they made monthly payments of
$141.50 each month beginning on August 20, 1979, and that Froerer
Corp. did not receive an assignment of Ranch Liquidators' contract
receivable until June 1980.

Thus, Ranch Liquidators received at

least $4,895 of the purchase price of the Property ($3,480 down
payment and ten monthly payments of $141.50).
Rescission is an equitable remedy that abrogates the
contract and restores the parties to their original positions.
McEnroe v. Morgan, 106 Idaho 326, 678 P.2d 595, 598 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1984) .
contract.

It precludes recovery of damages for breach of the

Whitelev v. O'Dell. 219 Kan. 314, 548 P.2d 798, 802
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(1976)•

In an action for rescission, a party is only liable for

the consideration or benefits received under the contract.

McGraw

v. Avlina fin re Bell & Beckwith), 54 Bankr. 303, 306 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1985).

Thus, if the plaintiffs are entitled to rescission,

the defendants are only liable for the amounts they actually
received under the contract.

The undisputed facts showed that

Froerer Corp. did not receive all of the plaintiffs' payments under
the Purchase Agreement.

Therefore, the trial court erred in

granting plaintiffs judgment against the defendants for the full
amount of the plaintiffs7 claim, and, if this matter is otherwise
affirmed, the action should be sent back to the trial court to
determine the correct amount of damages that the plaintiffs are
entitled to recover from the defendants.
CONCLUSION
Because the defendants did not assume Ranch Liquidators'
obligations and liabilities under the Purchase Agreement, they
cannot be liable for Ranch Liquidators' failure to deliver clear
title to the plaintiffs.

Moreover, because Froerer Corp. did not

accept a warranty deed from Ranch Liquidators with the intention
of taking title to the Property, the defendants have no obligation
to convey the Property to the plaintiffs.

In any event, Froerer

Corp.'s intention in taking a warranty deed from Ranch Liquidators
was a material question of fact that precluded summary judgment.
Similarly, the plaintiffs7 intention in recording their quitclaim
- 27 -

deed from Froerer Corp. also raised factual questions precluding
summary judgment*
The trial court erred in granting the plaintiffs rescission of the Purchase Agreement because Ranch Liquidators, the other
party to the Agreement, was not a party to this action and because
the defendants could not be returned to their status quo-

Finally,

the trial court erred in granting the plaintiffs a judgment for
the full amount of their claim since the undisputed facts showed
that the defendants did not receive all of the plaintiffs' payments
under the Purchase Agreement.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants respectfully
request that the court reverse the summary judgment granted to
the plaintiffs and remand this action for further proceedings.
DATED this 'S'

day of November, 1989.

DAVID R. OLSEN, Esq.
PAUL M. SIMMONS, Esq.
of and for
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 56* Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facta so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters 3tated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of dH papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depqsitions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.

